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TheHarborMaintenance Tax is a fundamentally ﬂawedmaintenance fundingmechanism for
the critical US port system. Three alternatives were analyzed. User fee rates were estimated
for either a national or regional tonnage based fee. Our results indicate thatmaintenance cost
recovering regional fees could vary widely from about 10 cents per tonne to nearly 80 cents
per tonne. A national rate would be about 30 cents per tonne. The large regional differences
and affects on bulk shippers are likely to make implementing andmaintaining cost recover-
ing tonnage based fees infeasible. Two other mechanisms are considered. One possibility is
to abolish the HMT without a replacement mechanism. The obvious strength of this
approach is its simplicity, the weaknesses is that it is not budget neutral. Another possibility
is to increase the federal diesel tax rate. One strength of the approach is the reasonable rate
increase required to recover port maintenance costs (estimated between 0.278 and
0.315 cents per liter). An additional strength is that relatively inefﬁcient fuel userswill either
make the largest share of the additional payments or the freight will shift modes to one that
ismore efﬁcient. Oneweakness is that the rate has been unchanged since 1997, this points to
the political difﬁculty involved in passing such a rate increase.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Approximately 75–90% of global trade by volume is handled by maritime transport (see for example: Asgari et al., 2013;
UN, 2012; WEF, 2012). This volume amounts to between 60% and 70% of the value of global trade. International maritime
activity involving the US accounts for roughly 2% of international trade, worth about $170 billion dollars annually
(USDOT, 2014). Domestic shipping in the US adds an additional $170 billion dollars annually. Therefore, the total value of
maritime shipments involving the US is approximately $340 billion dollars annually (USDOT, 2014). Clearly, these cargo
movements are very important domestically and worldwide.
Yet the mechanism responsible for generating harbor maintenance funding in the US is fundamentally ﬂawed. The Harbor
Maintenance Tax (HMT) has been the subject of Supreme Court rulings and GATT consultations. The former led to exporters
being exempt from payment while the later has strained trade relationships between the US and EU members. Both severely
challenge the sustainability of the funding mechanism for maintenance of the crucial US port system.6 8408;
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Fig. 1. End of Fiscal Year Nominal Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund Balance 1988–2012 (Billions $US). Source: Department of Treasury Ofﬁce of the Inspector
General Audit Reports: Reports on the Bureau of Public Debt Trust Fund Management Branch Schedules for Selected Trust Funds http://www.treasury.gov/
about/organizational-structure/ig/Pages/By-Agency-2014.aspx.
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of 0.04% of the value of commercial cargo with the intent of recovering 40% of port maintenance costs (Supreme Court, 1998).
In 1990, the HMT rate was more than tripled to 0.125% of the value of commercial cargo with the goal of recovering 100% of
port maintenance costs (Supreme Court, 1998). The intent of the value based collection was to limit the impact on US
exports, particularly low margin bulk commodities (AAPA, 2006). This intent has succeeded in an extreme way due to the
1998 ‘‘Export Ruling’’ which judged the HMT to be unconstitutional for exporters (Supreme Court, 1998). All export collec-
tions ceased in 1998.
The HMT created two major issues under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), now being administered by
the World Trade Organization (WTO). First, due to revenues being based on the value of commodities rather than mainte-
nance costs created, there is little relation between collections and expenditures. The Water Resources Development Act
of 1986 also created the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund (HMTF) which holds HMT revenues from the time they are collected
until they are disbursed by Congressional appropriation (Kumar, 2002).The HMTF has grown dramatically and this has not
gone unnoticed by European Union (EU) members. The ﬁrst consultation against the US by EU members occurred in 1992,
based on the HMTF surplus of $70 million (nominal). Prior to the export ruling in 1998, a second consultation took place with
EU members claiming that the HMT violated ﬁve articles of GATT. Neither of these occurrences led to a formal dispute panel.
Meanwhile, as Fig. 1 illustrates, the HMTF surplus reached $7.16 billion (nominal) at the end of ﬁscal year 2012 (USACE,
2010).
Second, Fig. 2 demonstrates how the export ruling has led to an imbalance of collections across imports, exports, domestic
and other shipment classiﬁcations. The most obvious of these is the discrepancy between import and export payments. Prior
to the 1998 export ruling, imports accounted for around 65% of the total HMT collections while exports paid in approximate-
ly 27% (USACE, 2010). Afterwards, the import percentage has consistently increased to about 80% as export collections quick-
ly receded to $0 (USACE, 2010).
There has been discussion regarding ways to address the issues surrounding the HMT. However, recent legislation seems
to have little to do with addressing both GATT concerns and more to do with rent seeking (see Section 2 for more details).
While Kumar (2002) and McIntosh and Skalberg (2010) outline procedures for creating GATT compliant user fees at the port
and national level, questions remain regarding implementation on the large US port system. This paper proceeds by seeking
to answer fundamental questions regarding user fees. Can reliable user fees be constructed from statistical analysis and are
they practical given political realities? If not, what other alternatives are available to move the US past the Harbor
Maintenance Tax and its GATT troubles?$0.0 
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Fig. 2. Nominal HMT collections by source 1988–2008 (Billions $US).
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US port funding mechanism. Second, the feasibility of three alternative mechanisms for the vital US port system are thor-
oughly analyzed and discussed. Finally, it adds to the larger discussion of transportation infrastructure funding in the US.
Our results indicate that cost recovering user fees are unlikely to be feasible or reliable. Using regression analysis, esti-
mated regional per tonne fee rates differ statistically with large magnitude rate differences. In addition, some regional
per tonne fee rates are above and below an estimated national rate. Based on actual shipping routes, an empirical example
illustrates the drastic increases in trip payments coal shippers would be charged if these rates were enacted. Additionally,
regions have incentive to ﬁght for their own self interest; the end results are likely to have little to do with maintenance cost
recovery.
Two other maintenance payment alternatives are introduced and discussed with regard toward political realities; abol-
ishment with payment from the US general fund (non-allocated tax receipts) and increasing the diesel fuel tax. Abolishment
of the HMT without replacement is simple but may be troubling politically since it would not be budget neutral and could be
interpreted as adding to the US budget deﬁcit. Increasing the federal diesel fuel tax rate has efﬁciency foundations and would
seem to have support from some key stakeholders given the estimated level of rate increase necessary to recover costs.
However, any type of tax increase is also likely to create political challenges.2. Background
There have been both academic and legislative alternatives presented to ‘ﬁx’ the HMTF surplus issue. McIntosh and
Skalberg (2010) suggest paying all appropriated shallow draft United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Operation
and Maintenance (O&M) costs with the annual interest from the HMTF. By doing so their statistical analysis indicated the
rate could decrease 28% from the current rate of 0.125% to 0.09%. The 111th and 112th Congresses considered bills to ‘spend
down’ the surplus, increase the tax rate to expand funds for landside port projects, and seek various exemptions for Great
Lakes shipping (see Frittelli, 2011, for legislative updates).
None of these ‘ﬁxes’ address both of the primary GATT problems in the HMT. For example, the Great Lakes shipping
exemptions currently being considered would likely exacerbate this issue by decreasing domestic collections and, all else
equal, increasing the proportion paid by imports. Eliminating all exemptions, including the export exemption, may help
to address the imbalance issue but has serious problems. First, it would require a reversal of the export ruling or a change
to the constitution; neither seems likely. Second, increasing revenues does not address the growing HMTF surplus. Third, the
US is unique in assessing a value based tax and value and maintenance costs, including dredging, are relatively less corre-
lated than other explanatory variables. The authors view any ‘improvements’ to the HMT as being short-run solutions that
are unsustainable based on their failure to addresses both the imbalance created by the export ruling and the large HMTF
surplus.
The use of an ad valorem tax to pay for maintenance appears to be unique to the US. Appendix 1 outlines how publicly
disclosing countries fund dredging at the port/national authority level. Of these eleven, six nations use a fee-based structure
similar to the user fee systems proposed in the US (see Kumar, 2002; McIntosh and Skalberg, 2010). The Netherlands,
Belgium, Germany, France and the United Kingdom fund their dredging projects either directly through their governments,
or through port authorities which receive government funding as a key source for their budgets.3. Tonnage user fee
In the export ruling the Supreme Court outlined their recommendation for the structure of user fees which should be
based on: ‘the extent and manner of port use depending on factors such as the size and tonnage of a vessel, the length of
time it spends in port, and the services it requires – for instance, harbor dredging’ (USACE, 2001, p.9). Kumar (2002) outlines
a procedure to create port level user fees based on tonnage, port stay, and draft. It is suggested that these variables be
assigned cost weights through a survey of primary stakeholders. However, McIntosh and Skalberg (2010) argue that stake-
holders are unlikely to come to a consensus and that statistical analysis should be used to determine the cost weights.
McIntosh and Skalberg (2010) focused on the creation of a user fee to replace the HMT. They created variables in a direct
effort to meet the Supreme Court criteria and regressed tonnage, vessel draft, and port stay on ACE deep draft costs (includ-
ing dredging).1 However, fully abiding by the Supreme Court criteria created harsh restrictions on their dataset and results.
First, they had ﬁve annual observations for 23 states largely due to calls data being very limited. Second, multicolinearity
was a major problem. They proceeded by weighting simple regressions, for each of the factors, based on the percentage of costs
explained and derived rates per unit which could be used to calculate a total fee per call.
An alternative is to consider creating a user fee based only on tonnage given the high degree of correlation between ton-
nage, draft, and port stay (McIntosh and Skalberg, 2010).2 The major beneﬁts are elimination of multicollinearity and increased
sample size as tonnage is available for more years than port stay. Additionally, McIntosh and Skalberg (2010) report tonnage
and deep draft maintenance costs being positively related with a correlation coefﬁcient of 0.766, the highest of the three factors1 McIntosh and Skalberg (2010) demonstrate that shallow draft costs could be paid using the interest from the HMTF balance.
2 McIntosh and Skalberg (2010) report correlation coefﬁcients ranging from 0.763 to 0.990 for tonnage, total draft, and berth days.
Table 1
Dredging proportions, cost per cubic meter, and dredging cost inﬂation index.
Fiscal Proportion $/m3 Proportion $/m3 Weighted Inﬂation
Year USACE USACE Industry Industry Mean Index
1997 0.27 $1.85 0.73 $2.82 $2.55 1.91
1998 0.20 $2.37 0.80 $3.54 $3.30 1.48
1999 0.19 $2.65 0.81 $3.26 $3.14 1.55
2000 0.20 $2.58 0.80 $3.26 $3.13 1.56
2001 0.18 $2.61 0.82 $3.52 $3.35 1.46
2002 0.19 $3.03 0.81 $3.71 $3.58 1.37
2003 0.18 $3.42 0.82 $4.24 $4.10 1.19
2004 0.16 $3.55 0.84 $3.64 $3.63 1.35
2005 0.19 $3.14 0.81 $4.03 $3.86 1.26
2006 0.22 $3.42 0.78 $5.29 $4.89 1.00
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appropriate determinant of USACE O&M costs and could stand alone (USACE, 2001, p.9).
Maintenance costs and tonnage data were needed for the regressions. Publically available cost data were restricted to the
USACE’s releases in the HMTF reports to Congress (USACE, 2010). Annual USACE deep draft maintenance costs were available
for 32 states from 1997–2008. The data from years 2007 and 2008 were withheld from the regression analysis for out of sam-
ple testing. To normalize costs to 2006 dollars, a dredging cost inﬂation index was constructed by weighting average annual
costs per cubic meter dredged from 1997–2006 (see Table 1). The weights were created from the annual proportion of dredg-
ing volume between the USACE and industry contractors (USACE, 2010, Table 5). After adjusting the USACE deep draft cost
data using the dredging cost inﬂation index, the correlation between real deep draft costs and tonnage is 0.527. Short kilo-
tons by state are available on the USACE Navigation Data Center site.3
Given the goal is to estimate a cost function, higher order tonnage terms and linear restrictions were considered in stan-
dard functional forms of linear, log-linear, and log–log (see Greene, 2000; McGuigan et al., 2011):3 httpRDDC ¼ b0 þ b1 Tonnesþ b2 Tonnes2 þ b3 Tonnes3 ð1Þ
where RDDC = USACE Real Deep Draft Costsln ðRDDCÞ ¼ b0 þ b1 Tonnesþ b2 Tonnes2 þ b3 Tonnes3 ð2Þ
ln ðRDDCÞ ¼ b0 þ b1 ln ðTonnesÞ þ b2 ln ðTonnes2Þ þ b3 ln ðTonnes3Þ ð3Þ
The ACE groups states by its own regional deﬁnitions so the ﬁnal panel data set stratiﬁed nine regions across ten years
(stratifying by state did not improve model performance). The Hausman test results showed the chi-squared test statistic of
8.19 (with 9 degrees of freedom) had probability value of 0.515. This indicated that ﬁxed-effects models were not preferred
to random-effects (RE). Therefore, RE models were deemed appropriate due to requiring fewer estimated parameters and
increased efﬁciency (Greene, 2000).
The constant terms on the RE models were either insigniﬁcant or borderline signiﬁcant. The constant in these models
indicates costs that cannot be attributed to tonnage which creates policy complications regarding their distribution. Some
poorly performing models even had ﬁxed costs greater than total costs with a negative slope coefﬁcient, indicating a rebate
based on tonnage. Due to the factors above, the constant terms were excluded. The Durbin–Watson test was inconclusive for
autocorrelation in models with linear tonnage terms and Rho was statistically equal to zero in models with squared and
cubed tonnage independent variable terms. These results suggested speciﬁcation was responsible for the inconclusive test
rather than autocorrelation. Groupwise heteroskedasticity was considered but did not improve performance using in or
out of sample testing.
The results indicated a RE model that included regional tonnage rate adjustments performed best:RRDDC ¼ b1 Tonneþ
X9
i¼2
bi Region Tonnei þ li þ eit ð4Þwhere RRDDC = Regional USACE Real Deep Draft Costs, i = region index, t = year index, li = random disturbance for region i,
eit = random observation disturbance.
In the regional regressions, region 1 is the base case where b1 is the costs attributed per tonne. Regional adjustments to
this rate are indicated by bi such that the implied total rate per tonne for region 2 is equal to ðb1 þ b2Þ.
Table 2 presents the coefﬁcients and implied rates per tonne for each region. They suggest that the rates are statistically
different than zero and that several regional rates are statistically different and have large magnitude differences. The range
of total implied rates is $0.10448 per tonne to $0.78093 per tonne. For comparison, a national rate model was developed by://www.ndc.iwr.usace.army.mil/data/datastat.htm.
Table 2
RE coefﬁcients and regional rates per tonne ($2006).
Region Coefﬁcient Rates/tonne
Base case: Great Lakes/Ohio River .24657*** $0.24657
Louisiana .10247*** $0.34904
North Atlantic .17022*** $0.41679
OR and WA .53436*** $0.78093
Paciﬁc Ocean .013636 $0.26021
South Atlantic .24182*** $0.48839
Texas .11973*** $0.12684
Minnesota .14209 $0.10448
NY and PA .027546 $0.21902
*** Statistically signiﬁcance at 1%.
Table 3
In and out of sample performance of regional and national models.
Model In sample RMSE (1997–2006) %Error = RMSE/average
costs
Out of sample RMSE (2007 and 2008) %Error = RMSE/average
costs
Regional rates 23,363 25.8% 37,716 54%
National rate 48,076 53.0% 29,987 43%
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sample tests were conducted based on the root mean squared error (RMSE) criterion. The results are presented in Table 3.
The regional rate model outperforms the national model by a wide margin using in sample testing. Yet, considering out of
sample testing (years 2007 and 2008) the national model leads to lower RMSE.
However, there seems to be a problem with the out of sample test as there is evidence this time range represents anoma-
lous data. On a regional basis, costs averaged 23% higher over 2007–2008 than in sample years 1997–2006, while tonnage
averaged 7% higher. Future testing will have an additional complication as ﬁscal year costs for 2009–2011 will include
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act government stimulus spending. The projects included in this spending may or
may not have been completed without these additional resources such that discerning the appropriate deep draft costs
amounts will be difﬁcult. Given the limited sample size it would seem collecting more data would be desirable yet these
complications create questions about the use of such data in future analysis.
Overall, if a user fee for tonnage was necessary in the short term, the RE regional rate model seems to be preferred based
on the available statistical evidence.4 However, this could be troublesome politically. Regions with rates above the national rate
would have incentive to argue for national rates while regions below the national rate would have incentive to argue for region-
al rates. Additionally, exporters would have incentive to claim these fees will make them less competitive; recall exporters have
not been making HMT payments since mid 1998, so any fee implemented across all groups is a relative costs increase for
exporters.
3.1. Empirically based user fee example
To demonstrate the potential impacts of the national rate model consider the amount of collection required compared to
HMT payments for a low value bulk commodity, coal. Table 4 presents such an example utilizing frequent domestic, import,
and export coal shipments.5 The domestic route considers a typical coal shipment from Superior, WI to St. Clair, MI.
Approximately 10 million tonnes are sent from the Superior Midwest Energy Terminal directly to Detroit Edison plants for ener-
gy production annually (see GLC, 1993; Limno-Tech, 2005). The underlying data for the regional tonnage fee is based on both
outgoing and incoming shipments such that one fee would be incurred after loading in Superior, WI and one fee for unloading in
St. Clair, MI. The two would sum to a total tonnage fee payment of $19,108 versus $3000 from the HMT.
The domestic route illustrates the political difﬁculty associated with user fees; intuition and regression estimation sug-
gest more costs associated with more tonnage yet switching to this mechanism would lead to much higher payments and
incentive for domestic shipping industry leaders to oppose such a change. The regional tonnage fee represents 0.796% of the
cargo value compared to the constant 0.125% from the HMT.
A large proportion of coal imports to the US are from Columbia (74%) and the customs district of Mobile, Alabama receives
roughly 26% of the imported coal (USEIA, 2010a). The regional tonnage fee would be $13,292 while the HMT payment is only
$2363. For this route the regional tonnage fee represents 0.703% of the cargo value.4 Using CPI adjusted costs did not change the main results (BLS, 2011). While individual regional implied rates differed, the pattern of statistically different
regional implied rates held. In and out of sample RMSE tests led to relatively similar results across the indexes. Due to the direct ties between waterborne
tonnage and harbor maintenance costs it seems appropriate to use the dredging costs index for these regressions.
5 It should be acknowledged that coal is not a uniform good, such that the values in the table may not be directly comparable across routes but are based on
averages provided by the US Energy Information Administration (USEIA).
Table 4
Coal Shipment Scenarios and Payments to US ($2006).
Policy route Current HMT Regional tonnage fee Increased fuel tax
Domestic
 Duluth, MN to St. Clair, MIa Value = $2.4 M MN + MI = $5687 + $13421 218,934 US Liters
 54,431 tonnesa
 Value = $44/tonneb Tax = $3000 Fee = $19,108 Tax = $689
 2172 km (round trip)a
 540 tonne km/la
Import
 Tolu, Columbia to Mobile, Alb Value = $1.9 M S. Atl. = $0.49/t [0,663,316] US Liters
 27,216 tonnesc
 Value = $69/tonneb Tax = $2363 Fee = $13,292 Tax = [$0,$2087]
 5630 km (round trip)d
 231 tonne km/le
Export
 Norfolk, VA to Amsterdam, Netherlandsb Value = $7.8 M N. Atl. = $0.42/t [0,2,563,740] US Liters
 63,503 tonnesf Tax = $0 Fee = $26,453 Tax = [$0,$8065]
 Value = $122/tonneb
 13,242 km (round trip)d
 328 tonne km/le
Sources:
a GLC (1993) and Limno-Tech (2005).
b USEIA (2010a).
c Based on facilities available in Mobile according to the Alabama State Port Authority: http://www.asdd.com/facilities_bulkmaterial.html.
d Shipping distances from World Shipping Register ‘Sea Distances and Voyage Calculator’. http://www.e-ships.net/dist.htm.
e Iowa Extension Ofﬁce: ‘Estimates of Total Fuel Consumption in Transporting Grain from Iowa to Major Grain Countries by Alternatives Modes and
Routes’. http://www.extension.iastate.edu/Grain/Topics/EstimatesofTotalFuelConsumption.htm.
f Virginia Maritime Association (2011).
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$7.8 million total shipment value of the exported coal, the regional tonnage fee of $26,453 is only 0.340% of the cargo value.
This is by far the lowest percentage of the three routes. However, in comparison to baseline HMT payments of $0 for expor-
ters, the magnitude of the regional tonnage fee would likely draw high criticism from the coal export industry. The $0 HMT
payment for exporters stands in contrast to the $9750 HMT payment that would be required for the same $7.8 million value
shipment from importers (or domestic shippers). This comparison illustrates the payment imbalance problem of the HMT.
3.2. Policy discussion of user fees
The regional tonnage user fee highlights the likely difﬁculties associated with implementing any user fee mechanism to
replace the HMT. First, groups that are currently being cross subsidized have incentive to strongly ﬁght any increases in pay-
ment. High tonnage shipping operations may argue that such fees may cause an inefﬁcient modal shift. Exporters may argue
against any maintenance payment policy that increases their costs.
Second, regional rates statistically differ from each other and the estimated national rate. National rates would increase
the domestic route tonnage fee in Table 4 to $31,408 (+$12,300) while decreasing the import route tonnage fee to $7852
($5440). This will make operating a system with multiple rates complicated and politically contentious.
These arguments may lead to a decentralized system which is likely to be even more troublesome. There are no guaran-
tees that states will estimate user fees consistent with costs. One might expect that other considerations such as port
employment (income tax) and port generated business (sales tax) are likely to outweigh statistical considerations.
Anecdotal evidence may be found in other revenue collection mechanisms; for example, the Federation of Tax
Administrators (FTA) highlights the differences in corporate income tax rates across states, ranging from 0% to 9.99%
(FTA, 2011). One can imagine ports close to state borders engaging in rate-undercutting strategies. The AAPA (2009) reports
there are over 150 deep draft ports under the jurisdiction of the US; shipping ﬁrms would have incentive to consider costs at
alternative ports that meet their requirements.
There is some evidence that port charges may inﬂuence throughput. Tongzon (1995) sampled 23 container ports based on
size, geography, and 1991 data availability. Port charges were found to be negatively related to throughput, although the
results were not statistically signiﬁcant. Fung et al. (2003) used 44 quarterly observations (1986–1996) to study the deter-
minants of container throughput for the port of Hong Kong. They found evidence negatively relating throughput and termi-
nal handling charges (THCs) at the 5% signiﬁcance level. They conclude, ‘‘. . .we found that THCs affected the Hong Kong
container handling industry by reducing its throughput’’ (p. 713). Therefore, it is not unreasonable to surmise that ports
may use low user fees as a way to attract trafﬁc rather than bring in port maintenance funds.
Further evidence of political difﬁculties can be found in the attempt to replace the inland waterways tax with a user fee
based alternative. The USACE provides annual federal budget updates to the US Ofﬁce of Management and Budget (USOMB).
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USOMB, 2008, p.123). However, these user fees were vehemently opposed by some groups including the Inland Waterways
User Board (e.g. IWUB, 2009, p.5). The USACE’s 2011 update dropped the Administration’s language of a desired ‘user fee’ for
the more generic ‘new funding mechanism’ (USOMB, 2011, p. 121).
Statistical and policy analysis agree on the difﬁculty of implementing user fees. The drastic nature of opposing views
between stakeholder groups generates suspicion about the usefulness of using surveying to inform user fee structure as sug-
gested by Kumar (2002). Section 4 outlines two alternative policies for eliminating the HMT that are likely to be GATT
compliant.4. Other GATT compliant policy options
4.1. Abolish the HMT with no replacement
Abolishment is likely the most simple to implement and may be preferred from an accounting perspective. A bill spon-
sored by Representative Borski (1999) ‘The Support for Harbor Investment Program Act’ outlined a similar plan: abolish the
HMT, use the HMTF surplus to pay maintenance costs until eliminated, and then pay maintenance costs out of the US general
fund. It ultimately ‘was not reported out of the Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment’ (Skalberg, 2007; p.66).
Consider the political climate when the bill was under consideration: the second EU consultation on the HMTF surplus, the
Supreme Court ‘‘Export Ruling’’, and recent US government budget surpluses should have created a favorable environment
for the proposed legislation (Viard, 1999). Yet, the bill ‘died’ (Skalberg, 2007, p.66).
However, a policy with the beneﬁt of simple implementation should not be undersold. Countries found in violation of
GATT typically have only 15 months to rectify the problem (USACE, 2010). There is also much debate regarding the amount
of congressionally appropriated funding drawn from the HMTF. Kurt Nagle, President and CEO of AAPA, provided testimony
in 2008 to the Water Resources and Environmental Subcommittee of the House Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee. He indicated that while the ACE estimates that the annual need for maintenance dredging is roughly $1.3 billion
to $1.6 billion per year, it spends roughly half that amount (Nagle, 2008). Much of the statistical analysis herein is based on
appropriated funding levels rather than the amount that may be necessary to properly maintain US ports. If President Nagle’s
claim is true the fees/rates presented herein would likely need to be higher. Such claims increase the uncertainty regarding
appropriate fees/rates.4.2. Increase diesel fuel tax rates
A second approach is to replace the HMT by increasing the federal diesel fuel excise tax rate. This option impacts trans-
portation costs of various modes. According to the US Energy Information Administration (USEIA), diesel fuel is responsible
for moving 94% of US goods (USEIA, 2011). The US Department of Transportation (USDOT, 2011) indicates that since 1997 the
US federal diesel fuel tax rate has been 6.4 cents per liter, while currently the average state diesel fuel excise tax is
approximately 5.1 cents (American Petroleum Institute, 2011). US fuel tax rates and subsequently tax revenues are relatively
low compared to those in Europe. According to Chouinard and Perloff (2004), European gasoline tax rates average 20 times
that of the US leading to a substantially higher proportion of government revenue.6 Increasing fuel tax rates might allow the
US government to use public funds to pay for port maintenance in a budget neutral fashion.
There are instances of support for fuel tax increases to pay for maintenance costs by industry leaders and stakeholders.
First, to address expected shortfalls in revenue, the recommendation of the 2008 National Surface Transportation Policy and
Revenue Study Commission (NSTPRSC) was to raise fuel taxes between 6.6 and 10.6 cents per liter over ﬁve years (NSTPRSC,
2008). Second, the American Trucking Associations and National Commission on Surface Transportation Infrastructure
Financing have supported increasing fuel taxes to pay for highway infrastructure (AP, 2009). Third, former US
Transportation Secretaries Mineta and Skinner have proposed gas tax increases (FoxNews.com, 2010). Fourth, the Bowles-
Simpson US Debt Reduction Plan included a 4 cent per liter gas tax increase (Hargreaves, 2012). Finally, a recent IWUB report
recommended increasing the inland waterway diesel fuel excise tax 1.6–2.4 cents per liter over the current rate of 5.3 cents
as a way to alleviate the dwindling reserves in the Inland Waterways Trust Fund (IWUB, 2010).7
Additionally, increases in fuel taxes can have important environmental effects; some have suggested such a policy is nec-
essary to combat CO2 emissions (Lofgren and Nordblom, 2010; Sterner, 2007). While most fuel taxes were not imposed for
environmental protection their effect on global carbon emissions is sizable. Sterner (2007) shows that if all OECD countries6 Approximately, 17% of UK’s budget revenues come from gasoline tax receipts.
7 One possibility to alleviate the problems with the HMT and the low balance in the Inland Waterways Trust Fund would be to combine the programs into
one consistent waterways policy. The HMTF could be relabeled as the Waterways Trust Fund and new collections would come from the proposed increase in
the national diesel tax. Based on recommended future funding by the IWUB ($380 million/yr for the next 20 years), a back of the envelope calculation from our
regressions suggests that waterway groups could be funded by about a 0.5 cent/l increase in the federal diesel tax; this would greatly reduce the burdens of the
current inland water way tax of 5.3 cents (proposed to increase to 6.7–7.7 cents) due to spreading the costs across other user groups. The new balance in the
Waterways Trust Fund would be large enough to start and continue projects without delay as the new mechanism began to collect (given Congressional
appropriation).
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high price scenario (e.g. UK prices) would lead to a 35% reduction; a hypothetical change from low-price to high-price fuel is
estimated to save 2.3 billion tonnes of CO2 emissions per year in the group. As countries look to reduce pollutants, it is
expected that fuel taxes will play an increasingly important role in future environmental policy.
4.2.1. Fuel tax rate estimation
There are some complications to estimating the necessary fuel tax increases to cover ACE O&M costs. USEIA data break-
downs include transportation distillate consumption (comprised of railroad, vessel bunkering and on-highway use) and total
consumption (including all distillate consumption and residual fuel oil). Using transportation distillate may lead to rate over-
estimates as some vessels use residual fuel oil which would ideally be included in the tax. Using total consumption may lead
to rate underestimates as houses, power generators, and others use residual fuel oil which would ideally be excluded from
the tax. Herein, both are used as independent variables in separate regressions to get an understanding of the possible range
of fuel tax increase required.
To estimate the increase in fuel tax necessary to cover annual real ACE O&M costs, annual USEIA (2011) distillate fuel oil
demand for transportation and total consumption were obtained and used in the following regression equation for years
1987–2008:8 The
index is
versus
sample
9 Thi
10 E.g.
11 DatRDDC ¼ b1 US Fuel Demand ð5Þ
where RDDC = USACE Real Deep Draft Costs.
Table 5 presents results, adjusted for positive autocorrelation, for two possible policy options which eliminate the HMT
but differ in the magnitude of expected tax revenues.8 Under the ‘‘Transportation’’ scenario only transportation distillate
demand is considered. A tax increase of 0.315 cents per liter would be required to cover annual deep draft expenditures.9
While this change represents a 4.9% increase in the federal rate it is a relatively small increase in the expected paid price of
diesel fuel.10 The second scenario would increase the tax on all distillate and residual fuel oil. Due to more types of consumption
being taxed, the rate declined in the ‘‘Consumption’’ scenario to 0.278 cents per liter.11
Fuel demand tends to be inelastic, particularly in the short run. Sterner (2007) suggests a short run price elasticity of
demand of 0.27. Therefore, all else equal, the implied increased fuel tax would bring in about 98% of deep draft ACE costs
in 2006 under the ‘‘Transportation’’ scenario and 111% under the ‘‘Consumption’’ scenario. This is in contrast to the HMT
which collected 198% of deep draft costs in 2006 (USACE, 2010).
Table 4 illustrates the effects of the estimated fuel tax on coal routes. The higher rate from the ‘‘Transportation’’ scenario
was used for the calculations. For domestic shippers, the fuel tax leads to the lowest maintenance payments, $689, as the
total dollar collections required are being spread across transportation modes including road, rail, and vessel (0.0287% of val-
ue). International shipments create a comparison problem since the US proportion of fuel purchases is unknown. However,
one can consider the full range of possibilities [0%,100%] for these scenarios. The import route is expected to collect a lower
amount from an increased fuel tax compared to HMT payments (0%, 0.110% of value). In the export route, the magnitude of
the fuel tax payments may increase with increased distance, depending on ﬁlling patterns, yet the high value commodity
being shipped leaves the fuel tax payment percentage of value low (0%, 0.103%). For domestic and import coal shipments
the fuel tax is expected to lead to the lowest magnitude payments. To avoid imbalance issues, export payments are expected
to increase with the fuel tax compared to the current HMT exemption. However, even if 100% US fuel was used the total
payments would be much less than the estimated regional tonnage fee.
4.2.2. Policy discussion of increased tax rates
Although proposed increases in federal fuel rates have not come to fruition there seems to be mounting support across
the transportation industry. The diesel tax increase necessary to cover appropriated deep draft USACE O&M costs is estimat-
ed between 0.278 and 0.315 cents per liter ($2006) depending on the breadth of diesel uses taxed. This may need to be
increased if under appropriation claims are accurate; based on information from AAPA President Nagle the rate may need
to be doubled (Nagle, 2008). Either way the rates are well below other proposals for increases including the industry sup-
ported 1.6–2.4 cents per liter increase for inland waterways users. Creating a relatively simple budget neutral approach
(compared to the proposed fee structure) that incorporates congestion and environmental externalities has some appeal.
The rate would need to be inﬂation adjusted and monitored over time with the continued goal of a $0 balance change in
the distribution fund.
Implementing the addition federal excise taxes could provide some challenges. For example, currently on and off highway
use of distillate fuel oils are treated differently for tax purposes and physically dyed different colors. However, it need not beresults presented in this section used the CPI. Since total diesel consumption is not as directly related to harbor maintenance costs it is unclear which
most appropriate. In the ‘‘Consumption’’ scenario using CPI to estimate the federal tax rate increase resulted in a lower relative in sample RMSE of 11%
25% when using the dredging cost index. Both are far lower than comparing real actual HMT revenue to real actual deep draft costs; the relative in
RMSEs were 82% for CPI and 74% for the dredging cost index. Similar results were obtained for the ‘‘Transportation’’ scenario.
s analysis continues the assumption that shallow draft expenditures would be paid with HMTF interest.
average price of $1.03 per liter in 2008 (FRED, 2011).
a from EIA ‘‘Short-term Energy Outlook’’ series http://www.eia.gov/steo/outlook.html.
Table 5
Federal diesel fuel tax increases per liter.
Deep draft
Transportation
2006 Change in Tax Rate $0.003146***
In sample: RMSE/average costs 13%
Consumption
2006 Change in Tax Rate $0.002784***
In sample: RMSE/average costs 11%
*** Statistically signiﬁcance at 1% level.
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modes would be taxed only the increase rather than the current federal rate plus the increase. Since this tax would replace
the HMT, most vessel groups would have incentive to support the change as their estimated total tax liabilities are expected
to be lower (for example, see Table 4). Railroad operators would experience a new tax of 0.278–0.315 cents/l. Finally,
highway diesel could remain uncolored and would pay at a higher rate of the current federal rate plus the increase.
Stakeholder groups would be affected in different ways from the increase in diesel excise tax. In 2009, about 74% of dis-
tillate and residual fuel oil consumption in the US could be attributed to the transportation industry which suggests impacts
from changes in the federal diesel excise tax rate will be highly borne on that sector (USEIA, 2010b). However, Delucchi
(2007) estimates that taxes and fee payments to the government by motor-vehicle users in the US are 5.28–18.49 cents/l
short of government expenditures related to vehicle use. Link (2005) demonstrated that in Europe receipts typically exceed
expenses. Therefore, the transportation industry may have a difﬁcult time opposing a higher federal diesel excise tax rate.
Vessel exporters may ﬁght the change since any budget neutral policy which addresses both GATT concerns will lead to
higher payments for this group; however, they may have a difﬁcult argument since they have not contributed to mainte-
nance payments since 1998.
An increase in the per-liter cost of shipping could alter the incentives of receiving entities in favor of larger loads hauled
by trains and vessels, where available. These shifts could potentially reduce road trafﬁc congestion. Skalberg (2007, p.67)
states: ‘This approach has been used successfully in Europe, with the support of the trucking industry’. As discussed in
Perrels et al. (2008) increases in road transportation costs have a substantial effect on modal choice, in particular, a shift
away from trucks to rail and water transport. While the policy herein would apply to all diesel fuel, such an increase would
disproportionately affect trucks which consumed 19% of the total energy used for transportation in 2009 whereas vessels
consumed only 5% and railroads and buses combined for 3% (USEIA, 2011).12
While the trucking industry may argue against the cross subsidization from an increase in the fuel tax, a congestion and
pollution alleviation argument could be made. Gorman (2008) calculates that 25% of truck freight could be handled at
signiﬁcantly lower operating and social costs by using rail. The decrease in social costs was estimated at 80% due to decreases
in pollution, congestion, and infrastructure maintenance. However, it is concluded that ‘‘. . .the societal beneﬁts of rail may
not be achieved without public sector involvement.’’ (p. 14).
Kallbekken et al. (2013) found similar factors to be important in garnering public support of fuel taxes in Norway.
Speciﬁcally, they found increased support for the fuel tax when its perceived effectiveness to reduce local air pollution
increased. A similar effect is found for trafﬁc reduction although it is not quite statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Support decreases as expected negative distributional and personal income effects become larger.
The US federal diesel fuel tax rate has been ﬁxed for nearly 20 years at 6.4 cents per liter (USDOT, 2011). Recently, both
representatives of the modal industries and researchers have suggested a tax increase to ﬁx transportation infrastructure
shortfalls. The estimated increase of the federal diesel fuel tax rate needed to replace the HMT is around 0.3 cents per liter.
This is well below other proposed increases to address surface transportation including truck and rail (6.6–10.6 cents per
liter; NSTPRSC, 2008) and federal debt reduction (4 cents per liter; Hargreaves, 2012). Therefore, whether considered
separately or lumped together in a more comprehensive transportation infrastructure funding proposal, the tax increase
needed to replace the HMT is relatively small.
However, despite the many proposals, the US federal diesel fuel tax rate has not changed. This might be a sign of the
political difﬁculty associated with such proposals. It seems likely that fuel suppliers will oppose any increase. Additionally,
public support may decrease as the fuel tax increase becomes larger and creates relatively larger personal income costs12 For a constant per liter fuel tax rate across mode, this result holds whether one considers a total payment by mode or total payment per tonne-km.
Considering total payment magnitudes: total fuel use of trucks is much greater than total fuel use of vessels which is greater than the total fuel use of rail, so
with a constant rate total payments will follow the same pattern (BTS, 2011). On a per tonne-km basis the problem can be simpliﬁed using algebra: total tax
payment per tonne-km by mode = (total liters mode⁄rate)/[total liters mode⁄(tonne-km per gallon of the mode)] = rate/(tonne-km per liter of the mode). Many
studies demonstrate the pattern of tonne-km per gallon for trucks being much less than tonne-km per gallon for rail which is less than tonne-km per gallon for
vessel (see, for example: Lawson, 2007; TTI, 2007). Therefore the payments per tonne-km ﬂip the inequalities: total payment per tonne-km for trucks is much
greater than total payment per tonne-km for rail which is greater than total payment per tonne-km for vessel. In 2008 vessel bunkering distillate fuel oil
consumption was approximately 2% of total US sales while highway use represented nearly 65% (by far the largest category), reinforcing the notion that
increasing the rate would disproportionately affect trucks relative to vessels (USEIA, 2011).
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ranked incentives and pricing policies the highest in terms of effectiveness for transport related carbon reduction options.
However, they ranked it statistically lower in terms of their preference. They also found, in their sample of UK citizens, that
political party was a statistically signiﬁcant determinant of preferences toward incentives and pricing policies. These compli-
cating factors add to the uncertainty regarding the likelihood of sufﬁcient support for a federal diesel tax increase.
5. Conclusion
The Harbor Maintenance Tax is a fundamentally ﬂawed US port maintenance funding mechanism. Three alternatives
were analyzed. First, user fee rates were estimated for either a national or regional tonnage based fee. Our results indicate
that maintenance cost recovering regional fees could vary widely from about 10 cents per tonne to nearly 80 cents per tonne.
A national rate would be about 30 cents per tonne. Low value bulk shipments would be greatly affected; we demonstrate
that per round trip maintenance fees could increase between $10,000 and $25,000 over HMT payments for frequently trav-
eled coal shipping routes. The large regional differences and affects on bulk shippers are likely to make implementing and
maintaining cost recovering tonnage based fees infeasible.
Two other mechanisms are considered. One possibility is to abolish the HMT without a replacement mechanism. The
$7.1 billion HMT trust fund surplus could be used to pay for maintenance until exhausted, at which point payments could
be made from the US treasury general fund. The obvious strength of this approach is its simplicity; additional funds would
not need to be collected so difﬁcult estimations of rates would not need to be calculated and updated. The weaknesses is that
it is not budget neutral; therefore it could be interpreted politically as adding to the debt or requiring all US taxpayers to
indirectly contribute.
Another possibility is to increase the federal diesel tax rate. One strength of the approach is the reasonable rate increase
required to recover port maintenance costs (estimated between 0.278 and 0.315 cents per liter). An additional strength is
that relatively inefﬁcient fuel users will either make the largest share of the additional payments or the freight will shift
modes to one that is more efﬁcient. One weakness is that despite documented support, from some important stakeholder
groups, of increasing the federal diesel tax for various transportation infrastructure needs the rate has been unchanged since
1997. This points to the political difﬁculty involved in passing such a rate increase.
We do not advocate for either approach, rather try to shed light on potential HMT alternatives. Although both have weak-
nesses it is likely that either would be a signiﬁcant improvement over the current HMT. Hybrid approaches may also be pos-
sible such as attempting to pass a federal diesel tax increase that would not take affect for several years and using the HMT
trust fund surplus to pay for maintenance in the interim; this may be more politically feasible than a policy that increases
taxes immediately. Other options may exist; we have tried to consider those most likely based on international funding
mechanism comparisons and the literature.
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Appendix A. International port maintenance funding examplesCountry Speciﬁc port Basin
upkeepFunding Summary descriptionAustralia Darwin Possibly
fee basedPort dues are charged in accordance with the schedule at: http://
www.darwinport.nt.gov.au/sites/default/ﬁles/documents/
Schedule%20of%20Port%20Charges%20as%20at%201%20July%
202011%20-%20%20Final.pdfBrisbane Port
authorityFee based The ‘Harbour dues are also cargo-based charges levied on the POB
(Port of Brisbane) shipping channel.’ Additionally, the Port of
Brisbane owns a ﬂeet of dredging vessels to conduct their own
dredging, and also subcontract for other ports in the region.
Source: http://www.portbris.com.au/LinkClick.aspx?ﬁleticket=
okmElNaYPDc%3d&tabid=162(continued on next page)
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upkeepFunding Summary descriptionBelgium Port
authorityDenmark Copenhagen/
MalmoGov. Possibly
fee basedWhile dredging is not speciﬁcally mentioned in these documents,
they describe the fee structure used in the ports of Copenhagen
and Malmo. The fees are based on vessel type, vessel
characteristics, cargo, and length of stay. Note: These documents
describe port fees, and other information indicates that port basin
maintenance is a government responsibility in Denmark so these
fees may be unrelated to dredging, but can serve as a fee structure
example. Source: http://www.cmport.com/Maritime%20Service/
Rates.aspxFrance Port
authorityGermany Gov.
Lithuania Possibly
fee Based
The port of Klaipeda uses a multi fee structure including a ‘port
water due’ for each vessel that enters the harbor waters. I have
been unable to conﬁrm if this fee is for dredging expenses, but the
possibility exists. Source: http://www.portofklaipeda.lt/en.
php/port_regulations/port_dues/294Netherlands Port
authoritySource: http://www.iatss.or.jp/pdf/research/29/29-2-06.pdfNew
ZealandPossibly
fee basedThe overall port fee structure for Auckland ports can be found at:
http://www.poal.co.nz/shipping_cargo/price_schedulePoland Possibly
fee basedWhile dredging is not mentioned, the port of Gdynia is using Co-
ﬁnancing within the European Union Cohesion Fund to
reconstruct its port channel. Source: http://www.port.gdynia.pl/
kanal/a_index.phpSweden All ports Fee based Sweden uses a fee based system with the fees determined by the
Swedish Maritime Administration (Sjofartsverket) Source: http://
www.sjofartsverket.se/pages/1792/Lotstaxa2011.pdfReferences
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